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Abstract
We extend a cognitive paradigm for gene expression based on
the asymptotic limit theorems of information theory to the
epigenetic epidemiology of mental disorders. In particular,
we recognize the fundamental role culture plays in human bi-
ology, another heritage mechanism parallel to, and interacting
with, the more familiar genetic and epigenetic systems. We
do this via a model through which culture acts as another
tunable epigenetic catalyst that both directs developmental
trajectories, and becomes convoluted with individual ontol-
ogy, via a mutually-interacting crosstalk mediated by a social
interaction that is itself culturally driven. We call for the in-
corporation of embedding culture as an essential component
of the epigenetic regulation of human mental development and
its dysfunctions, bringing what is perhaps the central reality
of human biology into the center of biological psychiatry. Cur-
rent US work on gene-environment interactions in psychiatry
must be extended to a model of gene-culture-environment in-
teraction to avoid becoming victim of an extreme American
individualism that threatens to create paradigms particular
to that culture and that are, indeed, peculiar in the context
of the world’s cultures. The cultural and epigenetic systems
of heritage may well provide the ‘missing’ heritability of com-
plex diseases now under so much intense discussion.
Key Words: biological psychiatry; cognitive paradigm;
gene expression; holonomy; homotopy; information source;
mental disorder; spontaneous symmetry breaking; topology
1 Introduction
1.1 Mental disorders and culture
Human mental disorders are not well understood. Official
classifications as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders - fourth edition, (DSM-IV, 1994), the stan-
dard descriptive nosology in the US, have even been char-
acterized as ‘prescientific’ by P. Gilbert (2001) and others.
∗Address correspondence to: R. Wallace, 549 W. 123 St., 16F, New
York, NY, 10027. wallace@pi.cpmc.columbia.edu. Affiliation is for iden-
tification only.
Johnson-Laird et al. (2006) claim that current knowledge
about psychological illnesses is comparable to the medical un-
derstanding of epidemics in the early 19th century. Physicians
realized then that cholera, for example, was a specific disease,
which killed about a third of the people whom it infected.
What they disagreed about was the cause, the pathology, and
the communication of the disease. Similarly, according to
Johnson-Laird et al., most medical professionals these days re-
alize that psychological illnesses occur (cf. DSMIV), but they
disagree about their cause and pathology. Notwithstanding
DSMIV, Johnson-Laird et al. doubt whether any satisfactory
a priori definition of psychological illness can exist because it
is a matter for theory to elucidate.
Atmanspacher (2006) argues that formal theory of high
level cognitive process is itself at a point similar to that of
physics 400 years ago, in that the basic entities, and the rela-
tions between them, have yet to be delineated.
More generally, simple arguments from genetic determin-
ism regarding mental disorders fail, in part because of a dra-
conian population bottleneck that, early in our species’ his-
tory, resulted in an overall genetic diversity less than that
observed within and between contemporary chimpanzee sub-
groups. Manolio et al. (2009) describe this conundrum more
generally in terms of ‘finding the missing heritability of com-
plex diseases’. They observe, for example, that at least 40 loci
have been associated with human height, a classic complex
trait with an estimated heritability of about 80 %, yet they
explain only about 5 % of phenotype variance despite studies
of tens of thousands of people. This result, they find, is typi-
cal across a broad range of supposedly heritable diseases, and
call for extending beyond current genome-wide assoication ap-
proaches to illuminate the genetics of complex diseases and
enhance its potential to enable effective disease prevention or
treatment.
Arguments from psychosocial stress fare better (e.g., Brown
et al., 1973; Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend, 1974; Eaton,
1978), particularly for depression (e.g., Risch et al., 2009),
but are affected by the apparently complex and contingent
developmental paths determining the onset of schizophrenia,
dementias, psychoses, and so forth, some of which may be
triggered in utero by exposure to infection, low birthweight,
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or other functional teratogens.
P. Gilbert suggests an extended evolutionary perspective,
in which evolved mechanisms like the ‘flight-or-fight’ response
are inappropriately excited or suppressed, resulting in such
conditions as anxiety or post traumatic stress disorders. Nesse
(2000) suggests that depression may represent the dysfunction
of an evolutionary adaptation which down-regulates foraging
activity in the face of unattainable goals.
Kleinman and Good, however, (1985, p. 492) outline some-
thing of the cross cultural subtleties affecting the study of
depression that seem to argue against any simple evolution-
ary or genetic interpretation. They state that, when culture
is treated as a constant, as is common when studies are con-
ducted in our own society, it is relatively easy to view de-
pression as a biological disorder, triggered by social stressors
in the presence of ineffective support, and reflected in a set
of symptoms or complaints that map back onto the biologi-
cal substrate of the disorder. However, they continue, when
culture is treated as a significant variable, for example, when
the researcher seriously confronts the world of meaning and
experience of members of non-Western societies, many of our
assumptions about the nature of emotions and illness are cast
in sharp relief. Dramatic differences are found across cultures
in the social organization, personal experience, and conse-
quences of such emotions as sadness, grief, and anger, of be-
haviors such as withdrawal or aggression, and of psychological
characteristics such as passivity and helplessness or the resort
to altered states of consciousness. They are organized differ-
ently as psychological realities, communicated in a wide range
of idioms, related to quite varied local contexts of power re-
lations, and are interpreted, evaluated, and responded to as
fundamentally different meaningful realities. Depressive ill-
ness and dysphoria are thus not only interpreted differently
in non-Western societies and across cultures; they are consti-
tuted as fundamentally different forms of social reality.
Since publication of that landmark study, a number of com-
prehensive overviews have been published that support its
conclusions, for example Bebbington (1993), Jenkins, Kleni-
man and Good (1990), Journal of Clinical Psychiatry (Sup-
plement 13), and Manson (1995). As Marsella (2003) writes,
it is now clear that cultural variations exist in the areas
of meaning, perceived causes, onset patterns, epidemiology,
symptom expression, course, and outcome, variations having
important implications for understanding clinical activities in-
cluding conceptualization, assessment, and therapy.
Kleinman and Cohen (1997) argue forcefully that several
myths have become central to psychiatry. The first is that
the forms of mental illness everywhere display similar degrees
of prevalence. The second is an excessive adherence to a prin-
ciple known as the pathogenic/pathoplastic dichotomy, which
holds that biology is responsible for the underlying structure
of a malaise, whereas cultural beliefs shape the specific ways
in which a person experiences it. The third myth maintains
that various unusual culture-specific disorders whose biolog-
ical bases are uncertain occur only in exotic places outside
the West. In an effort to base psychiatry in ‘hard’ science
and thus raise its status to that of other medical disciplines,
psychiatrists have narrowly focused on the biological under-
pinnings of mental disorders while discounting the importance
of such ‘soft’ variables as culture and socioeconomic status.
Heine (2001) describes an explicit cultural psychology that
views the person as containing a set of biological potentials
interacting with particular situational contexts that constrain
and afford the expression of various constellations of traits and
patterns of behavior. He says that, unlike much of personality
psychology, cultural psychology focuses on the constraints and
affordances inherent to the cultural environment that give
shape to those biological potentials. Human nature, from this
perspective, is seen as emerging from participation in cultural
worlds, and of adapting oneself to the imperatives of cultural
directives, meaning that our nature is ultimately that of a
cultural being.
Heine describes how cultural psychology does not view cul-
ture as a superficial wrapping of the self, or as a framework
within which selves interact, but as something that is intrinsic
to the self, so that without culture there is no self, only a bio-
logical entity deprived of its potential. Individual selves, from
Heine’s perspective, are inextricably grounded in a configu-
ration of consensual understandings and behavioral customs
particular to a given cultural and historical context, so that
understanding the self requires an understanding of the cul-
ture that sustains it. Heine argues, then, that the process of
becoming a self is contingent on individuals interacting with,
and seizing meanings from, the cultural environment.
Heine warns that the extreme nature of American individ-
ualism means that a psychology based on late 20th century
American research not only stands the risk of developing mod-
els that are particular to that culture, but of developing an
understanding of the self that is peculiar in the context of the
world’s cultures.
Indeed, as Norenzayan and Heine (2005) point out, for the
better part of a hundred years, a considerable controversy
has raged within anthropology regarding the degree to which
psychological and other human universals do, in fact, actually
exist independent of the particularities of culture.
Arnett (2008), in a paper provocatively titled The Neglected
95 %, similarly argues that US psychological research focuses
too narrowly on Americans, who comprise less than 5 percent
of the world’s population, and on perhaps another 7 percent
in Western countries. He asserts that the majority of the
world’s population lives in under vastly different conditions,
underlying doubts of how representative American psycho-
logical research can be, and finds the narrowness of American
research to be a consequence of a focus on a philosophy of
science that emphasizes fundamental processes and ignores
or strips away cultural context.
Henrich et al. (2009), in a wide-ranging review, extend the
considerations of Norenzayan and Heine, finding that West-
ern, educated, industrialized and democratic (WEIRD) sub-
jects, across domains of visual perception, fairness, catego-
rization, spatial cognition, memory, moral reasoning, and self-
concepts, constitute frequent outliers compared with the rest
of the species. They conclude that addressing questions of hu-
man psychology will require tapping broader subject pools.
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As Durham (1991) and Richerson and Boyd (2004) explore
at some length, humans are endowed with two distinct but
interacting heritage systems: genes and culture. Durham
(1991), for example, writes that genes and culture consti-
tute two distinct but interacting systems of information in-
heritance within human populations and information of both
kinds has influence, actual or potential, over behaviors, which
creates a real and unambiguous symmetry between genes and
phenotypes on the one hand, and culture and phenotypes on
the other. Genes and culture, in his view, are best repre-
sented as two parallel lines or tracks of hereditary influence
on phenotypes.
Both genes and culture can be envisioned as generalized
languages in that they have recognizable ‘grammar’ and ‘syn-
tax’, in the sense of Wallace (2005) and Wallace and Wallace
(2008, 2009).
More recent work has identified epigenetic heritage mech-
anisms involving such processes as environmentally-induced
gene methylation, that can have strong influence across
several generations (e.g., Jablonka and Lamb, 1995, 1998;
Jabolonka, 2004), and are the subject of intense current re-
search.
There are, it seems, two powerful heritage mechanisms in
addition to the genetic where one may perhaps find the ‘miss-
ing heritability of complex diseases’ that Manolio et al. seek.
Here, however, we are particularly interested in the pheno-
types of madness, and in their relations to genes, culture, and
environment.
1.2 Two case histories
1.2.1 Gene-environment interaction
Much recent work in American biological psychiatry has em-
phasized the search for gene-environment interactions. Caspi
and Moffitt (2006), for example, claim that such interac-
tions occur when the effect of exposure to an environmental
pathogen on a person’s health is conditional on his or her
genotype. The first evidence that genotype moderates the
capacity of an environmental risk to bring about mental dis-
orders was, according to them, reported in 2002, (Caspi et al.,
2002), in a study of the role of genotype in the cycle of vio-
lence in maltreated children. Caspi and Moffitt (2006) claim
that the gene-environment interaction approach brings op-
portunities for extending the range and power of neuroscience
by introducing opportunities for collaboration between exper-
imental neuroscience and research on gene-environment in-
teractions. Successful collaboration can, in their view, solve
the biggest mystery of human psychopathology: how does an
environmental factor, external to the person, get inside the
nervous system and alter its elements to generate the symp-
toms of a disordered mind? Concentrating the considerable
resources of neuroscience and gene-environment interaction
on this question will, they claim, bring discoveries that ad-
vance the understanding of mental disorders, and increase the
potential to control and prevent them.
One of the most cited of recent studies of gene-environment
interactions is, indeed, the work of Caspi et al. (2003), who
found that genetic variation in the promoter region of the
serotonin transporter gene (5-HTTLPR;[OMIM182138]), in
interaction with stressful life events, contributes to a predis-
position to major depression. As Risch et al. (2009) put it,
this result was striking and potentially paradigm shifting be-
cause numerous previous studies of this same polymorphism,
without examining environmental risk factors or life events,
had not consistently shown either a strong or replicated as-
sociation with depression. A subsequent meta-analysis was
conducted by Risch et al. (2009) that combined data from
some 14 studies having a total of 14,250 participants, some
1769 of whom met criteria for depression.
Risch et al. state that most of the participants were white,
except for a multiethnic sample in one study, and an Asian
sample in another. Contrary to the results of Caspi et al.
(2003), they found no evidence that the serotonin transporter
genotype alone, or in interaction with stressful life events, is
associated with an elevated risk of depression.
The Asian study, by J. Kim et al. (2006), involved 732
Korean community residents ages 65+, a fair number indeed.
Some 88 percent at baseline did not meet criteria for depres-
sion. Kim et al., in contrast with Risch et al., in spite of
using ‘standard’ instruments for both measures of depression
and life events (translated into Korean), found a strong sta-
tistical trend suggesting that environmental risk of depres-
sion is indeed modified by at least two genes, and that gene-
environment interactions are found even into old age.
Given the scathing analyses by Arnett, Heine, and Henrich
et al., the bitter conflict between the results of Caspi et al.
(2003) and Risch et al. (2009) is in serious danger of becom-
ing simply a culture-bound tempest in a distinctly American
teapot.
1.2.2 Gene-culture interaction
The necessity for the inclusion of culture in the operation of
fundamental psychological phenomena is emphasized by the
observations of Nisbett et al. (2001), and others, following
the tradition of Markus and Kitayama (1991), regarding pro-
found differences in basic perception between test subjects
of Southeast Asian and Western cultural heritage across an
broad realm of experiments. East Asian perspectives are char-
acterized as holistic and Western as analytic. Nisbett et al.
(2001) find:
(1) Social organization directs attention to some aspects of
the perceptual field at the expense of others.
(2) What is attended to influences metaphysics.
(3) Metaphysics guides tacit epistemology, that is, beliefs
about the nature of the world and causality.
(4) Epistemology dictates the development and application
of some cognitive processes at the expense of others.
(5) Social organization can directly affect the plausibility of
metaphysical assumptions, such as whether causality should
be regarded as residing in the field vs. in the object.
(6) Social organization and social practice can directly in-
fluence the development and use of cognitive processes such
as dialectical vs. logical ones.
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Nisbett et al. (2001) conclude that tools of thought em-
body a culture’s intellectual history, that tools have theories
built into them, and that users accept these theories, albeit
unknowingly, when they use these tools.
More recently, Masuda and Nisbett (2006) examined cul-
tural variations in change blindness, a phenomenon related
to inattentional blindness, and found striking differences be-
tween Western and East Asian subjects. They presented par-
ticipants with still photos and with animated vignettes having
changes in focal object information and contextual informa-
tion. Compared to Americans, East Asians were more sensi-
tive to contextual changes than to focal object changes. These
results, they conclude, suggest that there can be cultural vari-
ation in what may seem to be basic perceptual processes.
H. Kim et al. (2010) have extended this line of work to
examine the interaction between genes and culture as deter-
minants of individuals’ locus of attention. As the serotonin
(5-HT) system has been associated with attentional focus and
the ability to adapt to changes in reinforcement, they exam-
ined the serotonin 1A receptor polymorphism (5-HTR1A).
Koreans and European Americans were geneotyped and re-
ported their chronic locus of attention. They found a signifi-
cant interaction between 5-HTR1A and culture in the locus of
attention. Koreans reported attending to the field more than
European Americans, and this cultural difference was mod-
erated by 5-HTR1A. There was a linear pattern such that
those homozygous for the G allele, which is associated with
reduced ability to adapt to changes in reinforcement, more
strongly endorsed the culturally reinforced mode of thinking
than those homozygous for the C allele, with those heterozy-
gous in the middle. Kim et al. claim that their findings
suggest that the same genetic predisopsition can result in di-
vergent psychological outcomes, depending on an individual’s
cultural context.
The sample used in this study included 149 Korean and 140
European subjects. Given the problems with the Caspi et al.
work, it is clear that replication across larger samples will be
needed.
That being said, the results of H. Kim et al. do indeed un-
derline the necessity of expanding work on psychiatric disor-
ders to gene-culture-environment interactions. It seems likely,
however, that, overall, culture-environment interaction effects
will predominate. Nonetheless, the effects of genetic structure
on that interaction might well provide important insights as
to etiology and possible treatment.
1.3 Global broadcast models
Recent research on schizophrenia, dyslexia, and autism,
broadly supports a ‘brain connectivity’ model for these dis-
orders that is of considerable interest from the perspective
of global workspace/global broadcast models of consciousness
that are the foundation of our work (e.g., Baars, 1989; Wal-
lace, 2005), since large-scale brain connectivity is essential
for the operation of consciousness, a principal, and very old,
evolutionary adaptation (e.g., Wallace and Wallace, 2009).
For example, Burns et al. (2003), on the basis of sophis-
ticated diffusion tensor magnetic resonance imaging studies,
argue that schizophrenia is a disorder of large-scale neurocog-
nitive networks rather than specific regions, and that patho-
logical changes in the disorder should be sought at the supra-
regional level. Both structural and functional abnormalities
in frontoparietal networks have been described and may con-
stitute a basis for the wide range of cognitive functions im-
paired in the disorder, such as selective attention, language
processing and attribution of agency.
Silani et al. (2005) find that, for dyslexia, altered activation
observed within the reading system is associated with altered
density of grey and white matter of specific brain regions,
such as the left middle and inferior temporal gyri and left
arcuate fasciculus. This supports the view that dyslexia is
associated with both local grey matter dysfunction and with
altered larger scale connectivity among phonological/reading
areas.
Villalobos et al. (2005) explore the hypothesis that large-
scale abnormalities of the dorsal stream and possibly the mir-
ror neuron system, may be responsible for impairments of
joint attention, imitation, and secondarily for language de-
lays in autism. Their empirical study showed that those with
autism had significantly reduced connectivity with bilateral
inferior frontal area 44, which is compatible with the hypoth-
esis of mirror neuron defects in autism. More generally, their
results suggest that dorsal stream connectivity in autism may
not be fully functional.
Courchesne and Pierce (2005) suggest that, for autism, con-
nectivity within the frontal lobe is excessive, disorganized, and
inadequately selective, whereas connectivity between frontal
cortex and other systems is poorly synchronized, weakly re-
sponsive and information impoverished. Increased local but
reduced long-distance cortical-cortical reciprocal activity and
coupling would impair the fundamental frontal function of in-
tegrating information from widespread and diverse systems
and providing complex context-rich feedback, guidance and
control to lower-level systems.
Coplan (2005) has observed a striking pattern of excessive
frontal lobe self-connectivity in certain cases of anxiety disor-
der, and Coplan et al. (2005) find that maternal stress can
affect long-term hippocampal neurodevelopment in a primate
model.
As stated, brain connectivity is the sine qua non of Global
Workspace/Broadcast models of individual mental function
including consciousness (e.g., Baars, 1989; Wallace, 2005),
and further analysis suggests that these disorders cannot be
fully understood in the absence of a functional theory of con-
sciousness, and in particular, of a detailed understanding of
the elaborate regulatory mechanisms which must have evolved
over the past half billion years to ensure the stability of that
most central and most powerful of adaptations. For humans,
of course, one of the principal regulatory mechanisms for men-
tal function is the embedding culture and culturally-mediated
social interaction, in addition to culture’s role as the second
system of human heritage. As the evolutionary anthropologist
Robert Boyd has put it, culture is as much a part of human
biology as the enamel on our teeth (e.g., Richerson and Boyd,
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2004).
Distortion of consciousness is not simply an epiphenomenon
of the emotional dysregulation which many see as the ‘real’
cause of mental disorder. Like the pervasive effects of culture,
distortion of consciousness lies at the heart of both the indi-
vidual experience of mental disorder and the effect of it on
the embedding of the individual within both social relation-
ships and cultural or environmental milieu. Yet the experi-
ence of individual consciousness cannot be disentangled from
social interaction and culture (Wallace, 2005). Distortion of a
culturally-mediated consciousness in mental disorders inhibits
both routine social interchange and the ability to meet inter-
nalized or expected cultural norms, a potentially destabiliz-
ing positive feedback. Distortion of consciousness profoundly
affects the ability to learn new, or change old, skills in the
face of changing patterns of threat or opportunity, perhaps
the most critical purpose of the adaptation itself. Distortion
of consciousness causing decoupling from social and cultural
context is usually a threat to long-term individual survival,
and those with mental disorders significantly affecting con-
sciousness typically experience severely shortened lifespans.
Here we will expand recent explorations of a cognitive
paradigm for gene expression (Wallace and Wallace, 2008,
2009) that incorporates the effects of surrounding epigenetic
regulatory machinery as a kind of catalyst to include the ef-
fects of the embedding information source of human culture
on the ontology of the human mind. The essential feature is
that a cognitive process, including gene expression, can in-
stantiate a dual information source that can interact with the
generalized language of culture in which, for example, social
interplay and the interpretation of socioeconomic and envi-
ronmental stressors, involve complicated matters of symbol-
ism and its grammar and syntax. These information sources
interact by a crosstalk that, over the life course, determines
the ontology of mind, including its manifold dysfunctions.
That is, contemporary American work on gene-environment
interactions in psychiatry must be extended to the study of
gene-culture-environment interactions. This is no small mat-
ter, and the probability models we present here are at the
borders of current applied mathematics.
1.4 A cognitive paradigm for gene expres-
sion
A cognitive paradigm for gene expression has emerged in
which contextual factors determine the behavior of what Co-
hen characterizes as a ‘reactive system’, not at all a deter-
ministic, or even stochastic, mechanical process (e.g., Cohen,
2006; Cohen and Harel, 2007; Wallace and Wallace, 2008,
2009). The very different formal approaches are, however, all
in the spirit of Maturana and Varela (1980, 1992) who under-
stood the central role that cognitive process must play across
a vast array of biological phenomena.
O’Nuallain (2008) has placed gene expression firmly in the
realm of complex linguistic behavior, for which context im-
poses meaning, claiming that the analogy between gene ex-
pression and language production is useful both as a fruitful
research paradigm and also, given the relative lack of success
of natural language processing (nlp) by computer, as a cau-
tionary tale for molecular biology. A relatively simple model
of cognitive process as an information source permits use of
Dretske’s (1994) insight that any cognitive phenomenon must
be constrained by the limit theorems of information theory,
in the same sense that sums of stochastic variables are con-
strained by the Central Limit Theorem. This perspective
permits a new formal approach to gene expression and its
dysfunctions, in particular suggesting new and powerful sta-
tistical tools for data analysis that could contribute to explor-
ing both ontology and its pathologies. Wallace and Wallace
(2009, 2010) apply the perspective, respectively, to infectious
and chronic disease. Here we extend the mathematical foun-
dations of that work to examine the topological structures
of development and developmental disorder, in the context of
an embedding information source representing the compelling
varieties of human culture.
This approach is consistent with the broad context of epi-
genetics and epigenetic epidemiology. In particular, Jablonka
and Lamb (1995, 1998) argue that information can be trans-
mitted from one generation to the next in ways other than
through the base sequence of DNA. It can be transmitted
through cultural and behavioral means in higher animals, and
by epigenetic means in cell lineages. All of these transmission
systems allow the inheritance of environmentally induced vari-
ation. Such Epigenetic Inheritance Systems are the memory
systems that enable somatic cells of different phenotypes but
identical genotypes to transmit their phenotypes to their de-
scendants, even when the stimuli that originally induced these
phenotypes are no longer present.
After a decade of research and debate, the epigenetic per-
spective has received much empirical confirmation (e.g., Back-
dahl et al. 2009; Turner, 2000; Jaenish and Bird, 2003;
Jablonka, 2004).
Foley et al. (2009) argue that epimutation is estimated to
be 100 times more frequent than genetic mutation and may
occur randomly or in response to the environment. Periods
of rapid cell division and epigenetic remodeling are likely to
be most sensitive to stochastic or environmentally mediated
epimutation. Disruption of epigenetic profile is a feature of
most cancers and is speculated to play a role in the etiology of
other complex diseases including asthma allergy, obesity, type
2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, autism spectrum disorders
and bipolar disorders and schizophrenia.
Important work by Scherrer and Jost (2007a, b) that is
similar to the approach of this paper explicitly invokes infor-
mation theory in their extension of the definition of the gene
to include the local epigenetic machinery, a construct they
term the ‘genon’. Their central point is that coding informa-
tion is not simply contained in the coded sequence, but is, in
their terms, provided by the genon that accompanies it on the
expression pathway and controls in which peptide it will end
up. In their view the information that counts is not about
the identity of a nucleotide or an amino acid derived from
it, but about the relative frequency of the transcription and
generation of a particular type of coding sequence that then
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contributes to the determination of the types and numbers
of functional products derived from the DNA coding region
under consideration.
The proper formal tools for understanding phenomena that
‘provide’ information – that are information sources – are
the Rate Distortion Theorem and its zero error limit, the
Shannon-McMillan Theorem.
2 Models of development
The currently popular spinglass model of development (e.g.,
Ciliberti et al., 2007a, b) assumes that N transcriptional reg-
ulators, are represented by their expression patterns
S(t) = [S1(t), ..., SN (t)]
(1)
at some time t during a developmental or cell-biological pro-
cess and in one cell or domain of an embryo. The transcrip-
tional regulators influence each other’s expression through
cross-regulatory and autoregulatory interactions described by
a matrix w = (wij). For nonzero elements, if wij > 0 the
interaction is activating, if wij < 0 it is repressing. w repre-
sents, in this model, the regulatory genotype of the system,
while the expression state S(t) is the phenotype. These regu-
latory interactions change the expression of the network S(t)
as time progresses according to a difference equation
Si(t+ ∆t) = σ[
∑N
j=1 wijSj(t)],
(2)
where ∆t is a constant and σ a sigmodial function whose
value lies in the interval (−1, 1). In the spinglass limit σ is
the sign function, taking only the values ±1.
The regulatory networks of interest here are those whose
expression state begins from a prespecified initial state S(0)
at time t = 0 and converge to a prespecified stable equilibrium
state S∞. Such networks are termed viable and must neces-
sarily be a very small fraction of the total possible number of
networks, since most do not begin and end on the specified
states. This ‘simple’ observation is not at all simple in our
reformulation, although other results become far more acces-
sible, as we can then invoke the asymptotic limit theorems of
information theory.
The spinglass approach to development is formally similar
to spinglass neural network models of learning by selection,
e.g., as proposed by Toulouse et al. (1986) nearly a gener-
ation ago. Much subsequent work, summarized by Dehaene
and Naccache (2001), suggests that such models are simply
not sufficient to the task of understanding high level cognitive
function, and these have been largely supplanted by compli-
cated ‘global workspace’ concepts whose mathematical char-
acterization is highly nontrivial (Atmanspacher, 2006).
Wallace and Wallace (2008, 2009) shift the perspective on
development by invoking a cognitive paradigm for gene ex-
pression, following the example of the Atlan/Cohen model of
immune cognition.
Atlan and Cohen (1998), in the context of a study of the
immune system, argue that the essence of cognition is the
comparison of a perceived signal with an internal, learned
picture of the world, and then choice of a single response
from a large repertoire of possible responses.
Such choice inherently involves information and informa-
tion transmission since it always generates a reduction in un-
certainty, as explained by Ash (1990, p. 21).
More formally, a pattern of incoming input – like the S(t)
above – is mixed in a systematic algorithmic manner with a
pattern of internal ongoing activity – like the (wij) above –
to create a path of combined signals x = (a0, a1, ..., an, ...) –
analogous to the sequence of S(t+ ∆t) above, with, say, n =
t/∆t. Each ak thus represents some functional composition
of internal and external signals.
This path is fed into a highly nonlinear decision oscillator,
h, a ‘sudden threshold machine’, in a sense, that generates an
output h(x) that is an element of one of two disjoint sets B0
and B1 of possible system responses. Let us define the sets
Bk as
B0 ≡ {b0, ..., bk},
B1 ≡ {bk+1, ..., bm}.
(3)
Assume a graded response, supposing that if h(x) ∈ B0,the
pattern is not recognized, and if h(x) ∈ B1, the pattern has
been recognized, and some action bj , k + 1 ≤ j ≤ m takes
place.
The principal objects of formal interest are paths x trigger-
ing pattern recognition-and-response. That is, given a fixed
initial state a0, examine all possible subsequent paths x be-
ginning with a0 and leading to the event h(x) ∈ B1. Thus
h(a0, ..., aj) ∈ B0 for all 0 < j < m, but h(a0, ..., am) ∈ B1.
For each positive integer n, let N(n) be the number of
high probability grammatical and syntactical paths of length
n which begin with some particular a0 and lead to the condi-
tion h(x) ∈ B1. Call such paths ‘meaningful’, assuming, not
unreasonably, that N(n) will be considerably less than the
number of all possible paths of length n leading from a0 to
the condition h(x) ∈ B1.
While the combining algorithm, the form of the nonlin-
ear oscillator, and the details of grammar and syntax are all
unspecified in this model, the critical assumption which per-
mits inference of the necessary conditions constrained by the
asymptotic limit theorems of information theory is that the
finite limit
6
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
09
.3
89
4.
2 
: P
os
te
d 
11
 N
ov
 2
00
9
H ≡ limn→∞ log[N(n)]n
(4)
both exists and is independent of the path x.
Define such a pattern recognition-and-response cognitive
process as ergodic. Not all cognitive processes are likely to be
ergodic in this sense, implying that H, if it indeed exists at
all, is path dependent, although extension to nearly ergodic
processes seems possible (Wallace and Fullilove, 2008).
Invoking the spirit of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem, as
choice involves an inherent reduction in uncertainty, it is
then possible to define an adiabatically, piecewise station-
ary, ergodic (APSE) information source X associated with
stochastic variates Xj having joint and conditional probabili-
ties P (a0, ..., an) and P (an|a0, ..., an−1) such that appropriate
conditional and joint Shannon uncertainties satisfy the classic
relations
H[X] = limn→∞
log[N(n)]
n
= limn→∞H(Xn|X0, ..., Xn−1)
= limn→∞
H(X0,...,Xn)
n+1 .
(5)
This information source is defined as dual to the underlying
ergodic cognitive process.
Adiabatic means that the source has been parametrized ac-
cording to some scheme, and that, over a certain range, along
a particular piece, as the parameters vary, the source remains
as close to stationary and ergodic as needed for information
theory’s central theorems to apply. Stationary means that
the system’s probabilities do not change in time, and ergodic,
roughly, that the cross sectional means approximate long-time
averages. Between pieces it is necessary to invoke various
kinds of phase transition formalisms, as described more fully
in Wallace (2005) or Wallace and Wallace (2008).
In the developmental vernacular of Ciliberti et al., we now
examine paths in phenotype space that begin at some S0 and
converge n = t/∆t → ∞ to some other S∞. Suppose the
system is conceived at S0, and h represents (for example) re-
production when phenotype S∞ is reached. Thus h(x) can
have two values, i.e., B0 not able to reproduce, and B1, ma-
ture enough to reproduce. Then x = (S0,S∆t, ...,Sn∆t, ...)
until h(x) = B1.
Structure is now subsumed within the sequential grammar
and syntax of the dual information source rather than within
the cross sectional internals of (wij)-space, a simplifying shift
in perspective.
This transformation carries computational burdens, as well
as providing mathematical insight.
First, the fact that viable networks comprise a tiny fraction
of all those possible emerges easily from the spinglass formula-
tion simply because of the ‘mechanical’ limit that the number
of paths from S0 to S∞ will always be far smaller than the
total number of possible paths, most of which simply do not
end on the target configuration.
From the information source perspective, which inherently
subsumes a far larger set of dynamical structures than possi-
ble in a spinglass model – not simply those of symbolic dy-
namics – the result is what Khinchin (1957) characterizes as
the ‘E-property’ of a stationary, ergodic information source.
This property allows, in the limit of infinitely long output,
the classification of output strings into two sets:
[1] a very large collection of gibberish which does not con-
form to underlying (sequential) rules of grammar and syntax,
in a large sense, and which has near-zero probability, and
[2] a relatively small ‘meaningful’ set, in conformity with
underlying structural rules, having very high probability.
The essential content of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem is
that, if N(n) is the number of meaningful strings of length
n, then the uncertainty of an information source X can be
defined as
H[X] = limn→∞ log[N(n)]/n,
that can be expressed in terms of joint and conditional
probabilities. Proving these results for general stationary, er-
godic information sources requires considerable mathematical
machinery (e.g., Khinchin, 1957; Cover and Thomas, 1991;
Dembo and Zeitouni, 1998).
Second, according to Ash (1990) information source uncer-
tainty has an important heuristic interpretation in that we
may regard a portion of text in a particular language as be-
ing produced by an information source. A large uncertainty
means, by the Shannon-McMillan Theorem, a large number
of ‘meaningful’ sequences. Thus given two languages with un-
certainties H1 and H2 respectively, if H1 > H2, then in the
absence of noise it is easier to communicate in the first lan-
guage; more can be said in the same amount of time. On the
other hand, it will be easier to reconstruct a scrambled por-
tion of text in the second language, since fewer of the possible
sequences of length n are meaningful.
Third, information source uncertainty is homologous with
free energy density in a physical system, a matter having im-
plications across a broad class of dynamical behaviors.
The free energy density of a physical system having vol-
ume V and partition function Z(K) derived from the system’s
Hamiltonian – the energy function – at inverse temperature
K is (e.g., Landau and Lifshitz 2007)
F [K] = limV→∞− 1K log[Z(K,V )]V
= limV→∞
log[Zˆ(K,V )]
V ,
(6)
where Zˆ = Z−1/K .
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The partition function for a physical system is the normal-
izing sum in an equation having the form
P [Ei] =
exp[−Ei/kT ]∑
j
exp[−Ej/kT ]
(7)
where Ei is the energy of state i, k a constant, and T the
system temperature.
Feynman (2000), following the classic approach by Bennett
(1988), who examined idealized machines using information
to do work, concludes that the information contained in a
message is most simply measured by the free energy needed to
erase it.
Thus, according to this argument, source uncertainty is ho-
mologous to free energy density as defined above, i.e., from
the similarity with the relation H = limn→∞ log[N(n)]/n.
Ash’s perspective then has an important corollary: If, for
a biological system, H1 > H2, source 1 will require more
metabolic free energy than source 2.
3 Tunable epigenetic catalysis
Following the direction of Wallace and Wallace (2009), incor-
porating the influence of embedding contexts – generalized
epigenetic effects – is most elegantly done by invoking the
Joint Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem (JAEPT) (Cover
and Thomas, 1991). For example, given an embedding epi-
genetic information source, say Y , that affects development,
then the dual cognitive source uncertaintyH[X] is replaced by
a joint uncertainty H(X,Y ). The objects of interest then be-
come the jointly typical dual sequences zn = (xn, yn), where
x is associated with cognitive gene expression and y with the
embedding epigenetic regulatory context. Restricting consid-
eration of x and y to those sequences that are in fact jointly
typical allows use of the information transmitted from Y to
X as the splitting criterion.
One important inference is that, from the information
theory ‘chain rule’ (Cover and Thomas, 1991), H(X,Y ) =
H(X) + H(Y |X) ≤ H(X) + H(Y ), while there are approx-
imately exp[nH(X)] typical X sequences, and exp[nH(Y )]
typical Y sequences, and hence exp[n(H(x) + H(Y ))] inde-
pendent joint sequences, there are only
exp[nH(X,Y )] ≤ exp[n(H(X) +H(Y ))]
jointly typical sequences, so that the effect of the embedding
context is to lower the relative free energy of a particular de-
velopmental channel. Equality occurs only for stochastically
independent processes.
Thus the effect of epigenetic regulation is to channel devel-
opment into pathways that might otherwise be inhibited by
an energy barrier. Hence the epigenetic information source
Y acts as a tunable catalyst, a kind of second order cognitive
enzyme, to enable and direct developmental pathways. This
result permits hierarchical models similar to those of higher
order cognitive neural function that incorporate contexts in
a natural way (e.g., Wallace and Wallace, 2008; Wallace and
Fullilove, 2008). The cost of this ability to channel is the
metabolic necessity of supporting two information sources, X
and Y , rather than just Y itself.
This elaboration allows a spectrum of possible ‘final’ phe-
notypes, what S. Gilbert (2001) calls developmental or phe-
notype plasticity. Thus gene expression is seen as, in part,
responding to environmental or other, internal, developmen-
tal signals.
Including the effects of embedding culture in the develop-
ment of the human mind is, according to this formalism, quite
straightforward: Consider culture as another embedding in-
formation source, Z, having source uncertainty H(Z). Then
the information chain rule becomes
H(X,Y, Z) ≤ H(X) +H(Y ) +H(Z)
(8)
and
exp[nH(X,Y, Z)] ≤ exp[n(H(X) +H(Y ) +H(Z))],
(9)
where, again, equality occurs only under stochastic inde-
pendence.
In this model, following explicitly the direction indicated
by Boyd, Kleinman and their colleagues, culture is seen here
as an essential component of the catalytic epigenetic machin-
ery that regulates the development of the human mind. This
is not to say that the development of mind in other animals,
particularly those that are highly social, does not undergo
analogous regulation by larger scale structures of interaction.
For human populations, however, social relations are them-
selves very highly regulated through an often strictly formal-
ized cultural grammar and syntax.
4 Spontaneous symmetry breaking
A formal equivalence class algebra can now be constructed by
choosing different origin and end points S0,S∞ and defining
equivalence of two states by the existence of a high proba-
bility meaningful path connecting them with the same origin
and end. Disjoint partition by equivalence class, analogous to
orbit equivalence classes for dynamical systems, defines the
vertices of the proposed network of cognitive dual languages,
much enlarged beyond the spinglass example. We thus envi-
sion a network of metanetworks. Each vertex then represents
a different equivalence class of information sources dual to
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a cognitive process. This is an abstract set of metanetwork
‘languages’ dual to the cognitive processes of gene expression
and development.
This structure generates a groupoid, in the sense of We-
instein (1996). States aj , ak in a set A are related by the
groupoid morphism if and only if there exists a high prob-
ability grammatical path connecting them to the same base
and end points, and tuning across the various possible ways
in which that can happen – the different cognitive languages –
parameterizes the set of equivalence relations and creates the
(very large) groupoid. See the mathematical appendix for a
summary of standard material on groupoids.
There is a hierarchy in groupoid structures. First, there
is structure within the system having the same base and end
points, as in Ciliberti et al. Second, there is a complicated
groupoid structure defined by sets of dual information sources
surrounding the variation of base and end points. We do not
need to know what that structure is in any detail, but can
show that its existence has profound implications.
First we examine the simple case, the set of dual informa-
tion sources associated with a fixed pair of beginning and end
states.
Taking the serial grammar/syntax model above, we find
that not all high probability meaningful paths from S0 to S∞
are the same. They are structured by the uncertainty of the
associated dual information source, and that has a homologi-
cal relation with free energy density.
Let us index possible dual information sources connecting
base and end points by some set A = ∪α. Argument by
abduction from statistical physics is direct: Given metabolic
energy density available at a rate M , and an allowed devel-
opment time τ , let K = 1/κMτ for some appropriate scaling
constant κ, so that Mτ is total developmental free energy.
Then the probability of a particular Hα will be determined
by the standard expression (e.g., Landau and Lifshitz, 2007),
P [Hβ ] =
exp[−HβK]∑
α
exp[−HαK] ,
(10)
where the sum may, in fact, be a complicated abstract in-
tegral.
This is just a version of the fundamental probability rela-
tion from statistical mechanics, as above. The sum in the
denominator, the partition function in statistical physics, is
a crucial normalizing factor that allows the definition of of
P [Hβ ] as a probability.
A basic requirement, then, is that the sum/integral always
converges. K is the inverse product of a scaling factor, a
metabolic energy density rate term, and a characteristic de-
velopment time τ . The developmental energy might be raised
to some power, e.g., K = 1/(κ(Mτ)b), suggesting the possi-
bility of allometric scaling.
Some dual information sources will be ‘richer’/smarter than
others, but, conversely, must use more metabolic energy for
their completion.
While we might simply impose an equivalence class struc-
ture based on equal levels of energy/source uncertainty, pro-
ducing a groupoid, we can do more by now allowing both
source and end points to vary, as well as by imposing energy-
level equivalence. This produces a far more highly structured
groupoid that we now investigate.
Equivalence classes define groupoids, by standard mecha-
nisms (e.g., Weinstein, 1996; Brown, 1987; Golubitsky and
Stewart, 2006). The basic equivalence classes – here involv-
ing both information source uncertainty level and the varia-
tion of S0 and S∞, will define transitive groupoids, and higher
order systems can be constructed by the union of transitive
groupoids, having larger alphabets that allow more compli-
cated statements in the sense of Ash above.
Again, given an appropriately scaled, dimensionless, fixed,
inverse available metabolic energy density rate and devel-
opment time, so that K = 1/κMτ , we propose that the
metabolic-energy-constrained probability of an information
source representing equivalence class Di, HDi , will again be
given by the classic relation
P [HDi ] =
exp[−HDiK]∑
j exp[−HDjK]
,
where the sum/integral is over all possible elements of the
largest available symmetry groupoid. By the arguments of
Ash above, compound sources, formed by the union of un-
derlying transitive groupoids, being more complex, generally
having richer alphabets, as it were, will all have higher free-
energy-density-equivalents than those of the base (transitive)
groupoids.
Let ZD ≡
∑
j exp[−HDjK]. We now define the Groupoid
free energy of the system, FD, at inverse normalized metabolic
energy density K, as
FD[K] ≡ − 1K log[ZD[K]],
(11)
again following the standard arguments from statistical
physics (again, Landau and Lifshitz, 2007, or Feynman, 2000).
The groupoid free energy construct permits introduction of
important ideas from statistical physics.
We have expressed the probability of an information source
in terms of its relation to a fixed, scaled, available (inverse)
metabolic free energy density, seen as a kind of equivalent (in-
verse) system temperature. This gives a statistical thermo-
dynamic path leading to definition of a ‘higher’ free energy
construct – FD[K] – to which we now apply Landau’s fun-
damental heuristic phase transition argument (Landau and
Lifshitz 2007; Skierski et al. 1989; Pettini 2007). See, in
particular, Pettini (2007) for details.
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Landau’s insight was that second order phase transitions
were usually in the context of a significant symmetry change
in the physical states of a system, with one phase being
far more symmetric than the other. A symmetry is lost
in the transition, a phenomenon called spontaneous symme-
try breaking, and symmetry changes are inherently punctu-
ated. The greatest possible set of symmetries in a physi-
cal system is that of the Hamiltonian describing its energy
states. Usually states accessible at lower temperatures will
lack the symmetries available at higher temperatures, so that
the lower temperature phase is less symmetric: The random-
ization of higher temperatures – in this case limited by avail-
able metabolic free energy densities – ensures that higher
symmetry/energy states – mixed transitive groupoid struc-
tures – will then be accessible to the system. Absent high
metabolic free energy rates and densities, however, only the
simplest transitive groupoid structures can be manifest. A full
treatment from this perspective seems to require invocation of
groupoid representations, no small matter (e.g., Buneci, 2003;
Bos 2006).
Something like Pettini’s (2007) Morse-Theory-based topo-
logical hypothesis can now be invoked, i.e., that changes in
underlying groupoid structure are a necessary (but not suffi-
cient) consequence of phase changes in FD[K]. Necessity, but
not sufficiency, is important, as it, in theory, allows mixed
groupoid symmetries.
Using this formulation, the mechanisms of epigenetic catal-
ysis are accomplished by allowing the set B1 above to span a
distribution of possible ‘final’ states S∞. Then the groupoid
arguments merely expand to permit traverse of both initial
states and possible final sets, recognizing that there can now
be a possible overlap in the latter, and the epigenetic effects
are realized through the joint uncertainties H(XDi , Z), so
that the epigenetic information source Z serves to direct as
well the possible final states of XDi . Again, Scherrer and
Jost (2007a, b) use information theory arguments to suggest
something similar.
5 ‘Phase change’ and the develop-
mental holonomy groupoid in phe-
notype space
There is a more direct way to look at phase transitions in
cognitive, and here culturally-driven, gene expression, adapt-
ing the topological perspectives of homotopy and holonomy
directly within phenotype space.
We begin with ideas of directed homotopy.
In conventional topology one constructs equivalence classes
of loops that can be continuously transformed into one an-
other on a surface. The prospect of interest is to attempt
to collapse such a family of loops to a point while remain-
ing within the surface. If this cannot be done, there is a hole.
Here we are concerned, as in figure 1, with sets of one-way de-
velopmental trajectories, beginning with an initial phenotype
Si, and converging on some final phenotype, here character-
Figure 1: Developmental homotopy equivalence classes in
phenotype space. The set on one-way paths from Si to Sn rep-
resents an equivalence class of developmental trajectories con-
verging on a particular phenotype, here representing a highly
dynamic normal mind structure. In the presence of a noxious
external epigenetic catalyst, developmental trajectories can
converge on an abnormal mind structure, represented by the
dynamic phenotype So.
istic (highly dynamic) brain phenotypes labeled, respectively,
Sn and So. One might view them as, respectively, ‘normal’
and ‘other’, and the developmental pathways as representing
convergence on the two different configurations. The filled
triangle represents the effect of a composite external epige-
netic catalyst – including the effects of culture and culturally-
structured social interaction – acting at a critical developmen-
tal period represented by the initial phenotype Si.
We assume phenotype space to be directly measurable and
to have a simple ‘natural’ metric defining the difference be-
tween developmental paths.
Developmental paths continuously transformable into each
other without crossing the filled triangle define equivalence
classes characteristic of different information sources dual to
cognitive gene expression, as above.
Given a metric on phenotype space, and given equivalence
classes of developmental trajectories having more than one
path each, we can pair one-way developmental trajectories to
make loop structures. In figure 1 the solid and dotted lines
above and below the filled triangle can be pasted together
to make loops characteristic of the different developmental
equivalence classes. Although figure 1 is represented as topo-
logically flat, there is no inherent reason for the phenotype
manifold itself to be flat. The existence of a metric in pheno-
type space permits determining the degree of curvature, using
standard methods. Figure 2 shows a loop in phenotype space.
Using the metric definition it is possible to parallel transport
a tangent vector starting at point s around the loop, and to
measure the angle between the initial and final vectors, as in-
dicated. A central result from elementary metric geometry is
that the angle α will be given by the integral of the curvature
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Figure 2: Parallel transport of a tangent vector Vi → Vf
around a loop on a manifold. Only for a geometrically flat
object will the angle between the initial and final vectors be
zero. By a fundamental theorem the path integral around
the loop by parallel displacement is the surface integral of the
curvature over the loop.
tensor of the metric over the interior of the loop (e.g., Frankel,
2006, Section 9.6).
The holonomy group is defined as follows (e.g., Helgason,
1962):
If s is a point on a manifold M having a metric, then the
holonomy group ofM is the group of all linear transformations
of the tangent space Ms obtained by parallel translation along
closed curves starting at s.
For figure 1 the phenotype holonomy groupoid is the dis-
joint union of the different holonomy groups corresponding to
the different branches separated by ‘developmental shadows’
induced by epigenetic information sources acting as develop-
mental catalysts.
The relation between the phenotype groupoid as defined
here and the phase transitions in FD[K] as defined above is
an open question, and is a central focus of ongoing work.
6 Holonomy on the manifold of dual
information sources
6.1 Basic structure
Glazebrook and Wallace (2009a) examined holonomy
groupoid phase transition arguments for networks of inter-
acting information sources dual to cognitive phenomena. A
more elementary form of this arises directly through extend-
ing holonomy groupoid arguments to a manifold of different
information source dual to cognitive phenomena as follows.
Different cognitive phenomena will have different dual in-
formation sources, and we are interested in the local proper-
ties of the system near a particular reference state. We impose
a topology on the system, so that, near a particular ‘language’
A, dual to an underlying cognitive process, there is an open
set U of closely similar languages Aˆ, such that A, Aˆ ⊂ U . It
may be necessary to coarse-grain the system’s responses to
define these information sources. The problem is to proceed
in such a way as to preserve the underlying essential topology,
while eliminating ‘high frequency noise’. The formal tools for
this can be found elsewhere, e.g., in Chapter 8 of Burago et
al. (2001).
Since the information sources dual to the cognitive pro-
cesses are similar, for all pairs of languages A, Aˆ in U , it is
possible to:
[1] Create an embedding alphabet which includes all sym-
bols allowed to both of them.
[2] Define an information-theoretic distortion measure in
that extended, joint alphabet between any high probability
(grammatical and syntactical) paths in A and Aˆ, which we
write as d(Ax, Aˆx) (Cover and Thomas, 1991). Note that
these languages do not interact, in this approximation.
[3] Define a metric on U , for example,
M(A, Aˆ) = | lim
∫
A,Aˆ
d(Ax,Aˆx)∫
A,A
d(Ax,Axˆ)
− 1|,
(12)
using an appropriate integration limit argument over the
high probability paths. Note that the integration in the de-
nominator is over different paths within A itself, while in the
numerator it is between different paths in A and Aˆ. Other
metric constructions on U seem possible. Structures weaker
than a conventional metric would be of more general utility,
but the mathematical complications are formidable.
Note that these conditions can be used to define equiva-
lence classes of languages dual to cognitive processes, where
previously we defined equivalence classes of states that could
be linked by high probability, grammatical and syntactical
paths connecting two phenotypes. This led to the character-
ization of different information sources. Here we construct
an entity, formally a topological manifold, that is an equiva-
lence class of information sources. This is, provided M is a
conventional metric, a classic differentiable manifold. The set
of such equivalence classes generates the dynamical groupoid,
and questions arise regarding mechanisms, internal or exter-
nal, which can break that groupoid symmetry.
Since H and M are both scalars, a ‘covariant’ derivative
can be defined directly as
dH/dM = limAˆ→A H(A)−H(Aˆ)M(A,Aˆ) ,
(13)
where H(A) is the source uncertainty of language A.
Suppose the system to be set in some reference configura-
tion A0.
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To obtain the unperturbed dynamics of that state, impose
a Legendre transform using this derivative, defining another
scalar
S ≡ H −MdH/dM.
(14)
The simplest possible generalized Onsager relation – here
seen as an empirical, fitted, equation like a regression model
– is
dM/dt = LdS/dM,
(15)
where t is the time and dS/dM represents an analog to the
thermodynamic force in a chemical system. This is seen as
acting on the reference state A0.
Explicit parameterization of M introduces standard – and
quite considerable – notational complications (Burago et al.,
2001): Imposing a metric for different cognitive dual lan-
guages parameterized by K leads to Riemannian, or even
Finsler, geometries, including the usual geodesics (e.g., Wal-
lace and Fullilove, 2008; Glazebrook and Wallace, 2009a, b).
The dynamics, as we have presented them so far, have been
noiseless. The simplest generalized Onsager relation in the
presence of noise might be rewritten as
dM/dt = LdS/dM+ σW (t),
where σ is a constant and W (t) represents white noise.
Again, S is seen as a function of the parameterM. This leads
directly to a family of classic stochastic differential equations
of the form
dMt = L(t,M)dt+ σ(t,M)dBt,
(16)
where L and σ are appropriately regular functions of t and
M, and dBt represents the noise structure, characterized by
its quadratic variation. In the sense of Emery (1989), this
leads into complicated realms of stochastic differential geom-
etry and related topics.
The natural generalization is to a system of developmental
processes that interact via mutual information crosstalk, as
described by Wallace and Wallace (2009).
6.2 ‘Coevolutionary’ development
The model can be applied to multiple interacting information
sources representing simultaneous gene expression processes.
This is, in a broad sense, a ‘coevolutionary’ phenomenon in
that the development of one process may affect that of others.
Most generally we assume that different cognitive develop-
mental subprocesses of gene expression characterized by infor-
mation sources Hm interact through chemical or other signals
and assume that different processes become each other’s prin-
cipal environments, a broadly coevolutionary phenomenon.
We write
Hm = Hm(K1...Ks, ...Hj ...),
(17)
where the Ks represent other relevant parameters and j 6=
m.
The dynamics of such a system is driven by a recursive
network of stochastic differential equations, similar to those
used to study many other highly parallel dynamic structures
(e.g., Zhu et al., 2007).
Letting the Kj and Hm all be represented as parameters
Qj , (with the caveat that Hm not depend on itself), one can
define, according to the generalized Onsager development of
Wallace and Wallace (2009),
Sm = Hm −
∑
i
Qi∂Hm/∂Qi
to obtain a complicated recursive system of phenomenolog-
ical ‘Onsager relations’ stochastic differential equations,
dQjt =
∑
i[Lj,i(t, ...∂S
m/∂Qi...)dt +
σj,i(t, ...∂S
m/∂Qi...)dBit],
(18)
where, again for notational simplicity only, we have ex-
pressed both the Hj and the external K’s in terms of the
same symbols Qj .
m ranges over the Hm and we could allow different kinds
of ‘noise’ dBit, having particular forms of quadratic variation
that may, in fact, represent a projection of environmental fac-
tors under something like a rate distortion manifold (Glaze-
brook and Wallace, 2009).
As usual for such systems, there will be multiple quasi-
stable points within a given system’s Hm, representing a class
of generalized resilience modes accessible via holonomy punc-
tuation.
There are other possible patterns:
1. Setting equation (18) equal to zero and solving for sta-
tionary points gives attractor states since the noise terms pre-
clude unstable equilibria.
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2. This system may, however, converge to limit cycle or
‘strange attractors’ that are very highly dynamic.
3. What is converged to in both cases is not a simple state
or limit cycle of states. Rather it is an equivalence class, or set
of them, of generalized language information sources coupled
by mutual interaction through crosstalk. Thus ‘stability’ in
this extended model represents particular patterns of ongoing
dynamics rather than some identifiable ‘state’, although such
dynamics may be indexed by a ‘stable’ set of phenotypes.
Here we become enmeshed in a system of highly recur-
sive phenomenological stochastic differential equations, but
at a deeper level than the standard stochastic chemical reac-
tion model (e.g., Zhu et al., 2007), and in a dynamic rather
than static manner: the objects of this system are equivalence
classes of information sources and their crosstalk, rather than
simple final states of a chemical system.
We have defined a groupoid for the system based on a
particular set of equivalence classes of information sources
dual to cognitive processes. That groupoid parsimoniously
characterizes the available dynamical manifolds, and break-
ing of the groupoid symmetry by epigenetic crosstalk creates
more complex objects of considerable interest. This leads to
the possibility, indeed, the necessity of epigenetic Deus ex
Machina mechanisms – analogous to programming, stochas-
tic resonance, etc. – to force transitions between the different
possible modes within and across dynamic manifolds. In one
model the external ‘programmer’ creates the manifold struc-
ture, and the system hunts within that structure for the ‘solu-
tion’ to the problem according to equivalence classes of paths
on the manifold. Noise, as with random mutation in evolu-
tionary algorithms, precludes simple unstable equilibria, but
not other possible structures.
Equivalence classes of states gave dual information sources.
Equivalence classes of information sources give different char-
acteristic dynamical manifolds. Equivalence classes of one-
way developmental paths produce different directed homotopy
topologies characterizing those dynamical manifolds. This in-
troduces the possibility of having different quasi-stable modes
within individual manifolds, and leads to ideas of holonomy
and the holonomy groupoid of the set of quasi-stable devel-
opmental modes.
7 Extending the mathematical for-
malism
We have, in the context of the tunable epigenetic cataly-
sis of Wallace and Wallace (2009), developed three separate
phase transition/branching models of cognitive gene expres-
sion based on groupoid structures that may be applied to
the development of the human mind and its dysfunctions, as
known to be particularly influenced by embedding culture.
The first used Landau’s spontaneous symmetry breaking to
explore phase transitions in a groupoid free energy FD[K].
The second examined a holonomy groupoid in phenotype
space generated by disjoint developmental homotopy equiv-
alence classes, and ‘loops’ constructed by pairing one-way de-
velopment paths. The third introduced a metric on a man-
ifold of different information sources dual to cognitive gene
expression, leading to a more conventional picture of parallel
transport around a loop leading to holonomy. The dynamical
groupoid of Wallace and Fullilove (2008, Sec. 3.8) is seen as
involving a disjoint union across underlying manifolds that
produces a holonomy groupoid in a natural manner.
There are a number of evident mathematical questions.
The first is the relation between the Landau formalism and
the structures of phenotype space S and those of the associ-
ated manifold of dual information sources, the manifold M
having metric M. How does epigenetic catalysis in M -space
imposes structure on S-space? How is this related to sponta-
neous symmetry breaking?
What would a stochastic version of the theory, in the sense
of Emery (1989), look like? It is quite possible, using appro-
priate averages of the stochastic differential equations that
arise naturally, to define parallel transport, holonomy, and
the like for these structures. In particular a stochastic ex-
tension of the results of the first question would seem both
fairly direct and interesting from a real-world perspective, as
development is always ‘noisy’.
The construction of loops from directed homotopy arcs in
figure 1 is complicated by the necessity of imposing a consis-
tent piecewise patching rule for parallel translation at the end
of each arc, say from Si to Sn. This can probably be done by
some standard fiat, but the details will likely be messy.
One extension of theory would be of great interest: We
have imposed metrics on S and M space, making possible a
fairly standard manifold analysis of complex cognitive pro-
cesses of gene expression and development. While this is no
small thing, an important ‘natural’ generalization, given the
ubiquity of groupoids across our formalism, would be to a
groupoid atlas, in the sense of Bak et al., (2006) and Glaze-
brook and Wallace (2009b, Section 7.4). The groupoid atlas
permits a weaker structure compared with that of a conven-
tional manifold since no condition of compatibility between
arbitrary overlaps of the patches is necessary. It is possible
that the groupoid atlas will become, to complicated problems
in biological cognitive process, something of what the Rie-
mannian manifold has been to physics. The groupoid atlas,
unlike the Riemannian manifold, is quite new and under ac-
tive study.
With regard to questions of ‘smoothness’, we are assuming
that the cognitive landscape of gene expression is sufficiently
rich that discrete paths can be well approximated as contin-
uous where necessary, the usual physicist’s hack.
Finally, sections 5 and 6 are based on existence of more-or-
less conventional metrics, and this may not be a good approx-
imation to many real systems. Extending topological phase
transition theory to ‘weaker’ topologies, e.g., Finsler geome-
tries and the like, is not a trivial task.
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8 Discussion
Culturally structured psychosocial stress, and similar noxious
exposures, can write distorted images of themselves onto hu-
man ontology – both child growth, and, if sufficiently power-
ful, adult development as well – by a variety of mechanisms,
initiating a punctuated trajectory to characteristic forms of
comorbid mind/body dysfunction. This occurs in a manner
recognizably analogous to resilience domain shifts affecting
stressed ecosystems (e.g., Wallace, 2008; Holling, 1973; Gun-
derson, 2000). Consequently, like ecosystem restoration, re-
versal or palliation may often be exceedingly difficult once
a generalized domain shift has taken place. Thus a public
health approach to the prevention of mental disorders may
be paramount: rather than seeking to understand why half
a population does not respond to the LD50 of a teratogenic
environmental exposure, one seeks policies and social reforms
that limit the exposure.
Both socio-cultural and epigenetic environmental influences
– like gene methylation – are heritable, in addition to genetic
mechanisms. The missing heritability of complex diseases
that Manolio et al. (2009) seek to find in more and better
gene studies is most likely dispersed within the ‘dark matter’
of these two other systems of heritage that together constitute
the larger, and likely highly synergistic, regulatory machinery
for gene expression. More and more purely genetic studies
would, under such circumstances, be akin to using increas-
ingly powerful microscopes to look for cosmic membranes of
strewn galaxies.
A crucial matter for future work is the conversion of the
probability models we present here into statistical tools suit-
able for analyzing real data. This requires not only program-
ming the models for use, but identifying appropriate real-
world problems, assembling available data sets, transforming
the data as needed for the models, and actually applying the
programs. Indeed, the environmental health literature con-
tains numerous examples of developmental deviations due to
either chemical exposures or interaction between chemical and
socioeconomic exposures, and these could serve as sources of
data for direct analysis (e.g., Needleman et al., 1996; Fullilove,
2004; Dietrich et al., 2001; Miranda et al., 2007; Glass et al.,
2009; Jacobson and Jacobson, 2003; Shankardass et al., 2009;
Clougherty et al., 2007; Ben Jonathan et al., 2009; Karp et
al., 2005; Sarlio-Lahteenkorva and Lahelma, 2001; Wallace
and Wallace, 2005; Wallace, Wallace and Rauh, 2003). Thus,
quite a number of data sets exist in the environmental health
and socioeconomic epidemiological literature that could be
subjected to meta-analysis and other review for model veri-
fication and fitting. Our topological models, when converted
to statistical tools for data analysis, hold great potential for
understanding developmental trajectories and interfering fac-
tors (teratogens) through the life course. Sets of cross cultural
variants of these data focusing specifically on mental disor-
ders, would be needed to address the particular concerns of
this paper.
Nonetheless, what we have done is of no small interest
for understanding the ontology of the human mind and its
pathologies. West-Eberhard (2003, 2005) argues that any
new input, whether it comes from the genome, like a mu-
tation, or from the external environment, like a temperature
change, a pathogen, or a parental opinion, has a developmen-
tal effect only if the preexisting phenotype is responsive to
it. A new input causes a reorganization of the phenotype,
or ‘developmental recombination’. In developmental recom-
bination, phenotypic traits are expressed in new or distinctive
combinations during ontogeny, or undergo correlated quanti-
tative change in dimensions. Developmental recombination
can result in evolutionary divergence at all levels of organiza-
tion.
According to West-Eberhard, individual development can
be visualized as a series of branching pathways. Each branch
point is a developmental decision, or switch point, governed
by some regulatory apparatus, and each switch point defines a
modular trait. Developmental recombination implies the ori-
gin or deletion of a branch and a new or lost modular trait.
The novel regulatory response and the novel trait originate
simultaneously. Their origins are, in fact, inseparable events:
There cannot, West-Eberhard concludes, be a change in the
phenotype, a novel phenotypic state, without an altered de-
velopmental pathway.
Our analysis provides a new formal picture of this process
as it applies to the human mind: The normal branching of
developmental trajectories, and the disruptive impacts of ter-
atogeneic events of various kinds, can be described in terms
of a growing sequence of holonomy groupoids, each associ-
ated with a set of dual information sources representing pat-
terns of cognitive gene expression catalyzed by epigenetic in-
formation sources that, for humans, must include culture and
culturally-modulated social interaction as well as more direct
mechanisms like gene methylation. This is a novel way of
looking at human mental development and its disorders that
may prove to be of some use. The most important innovation
of this work, however, seems to be the natural incorporation
of embedding culture as an essential component of the epi-
genetic regulation of human mental development, and in the
effects of environment on the expression of mental disorders,
bringing what is perhaps the central reality of human biology
into the center of contemporary biological psychiatry.
In sum, we have outlined a broad class of probability mod-
els of gene-culture-environment interaction that might help
current studies of gene-environment interaction in American
psychiatry avoid Heine’s (2001) trap of developing an under-
standing of the self, and its disorders, that is peculiar in the
context of the world’s cultures.
9 Mathematical Appendix:
Groupoids
9.1 Basic Ideas
Following Weinstein (1996) closely, a groupoid, G, is defined
by a base set A upon which some mapping – a morphism – can
be defined. Note that not all possible pairs of states (aj , ak)
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in the base set A can be connected by such a morphism.
Those that can define the groupoid element, a morphism
g = (aj , ak) having the natural inverse g
−1 = (ak, aj). Given
such a pairing, it is possible to define ‘natural’ end-point maps
α(g) = aj , β(g) = ak from the set of morphisms G into A, and
a formally associative product in the groupoid g1g2 provided
α(g1g2) = α(g1), β(g1g2) = β(g2), and β(g1) = α(g2). Then
the product is defined, and associative, (g1g2)g3 = g1(g2g3).
In addition, there are natural left and right identity ele-
ments λg, ρg such that λgg = g = gρg (Weinstein, 1996).
An orbit of the groupoid G over A is an equivalence class
for the relation aj ∼ Gak if and only if there is a groupoid
element g with α(g) = aj and β(g) = ak. Following Cannas da
Silva and Weinstein (1999), we note that a groupoid is called
transitive if it has just one orbit. The transitive groupoids
are the building blocks of groupoids in that there is a natural
decomposition of the base space of a general groupoid into
orbits. Over each orbit there is a transitive groupoid, and
the disjoint union of these transitive groupoids is the original
groupoid. Conversely, the disjoint union of groupoids is itself
a groupoid.
The isotropy group of a ∈ X consists of those g in G with
α(g) = a = β(g). These groups prove fundamental to classi-
fying groupoids.
If G is any groupoid over A, the map (α, β) : G→ A×A is
a morphism from G to the pair groupoid of A. The image of
(α, β) is the orbit equivalence relation ∼ G, and the functional
kernel is the union of the isotropy groups. If f : X → Y is a
function, then the kernel of f , ker(f) = [(x1, x2) ∈ X ×X :
f(x1) = f(x2)] defines an equivalence relation.
Groupoids may have additional structure. As Weinstein
(1996) explains, a groupoid G is a topological groupoid over a
base space X if G and X are topological spaces and α, β and
multiplication are continuous maps. A criticism sometimes
applied to groupoid theory is that their classification up to
isomorphism is nothing other than the classification of equiv-
alence relations via the orbit equivalence relation and groups
via the isotropy groups. The imposition of a compatible topo-
logical structure produces a nontrivial interaction between the
two structures.
In essence, a groupoid is a category in which all morphisms
have an inverse, here defined in terms of connection to a base
point by a meaningful path of an information source dual to
a cognitive process.
As Weinstein (1996) points out, the morphism (α, β) sug-
gests another way of looking at groupoids. A groupoid over
A identifies not only which elements of A are equivalent to
one another (isomorphic), but it also parametizes the different
ways (isomorphisms) in which two elements can be equivalent,
i.e., all possible information sources dual to some cognitive
process. Given the information theoretic characterization of
cognition presented above, this produces a full modular cog-
nitive network in a highly natural manner.
Brown (1987) describes the fundamental structure as fol-
lows:
A groupoid should be thought of as a group with
many objects, or with many identities... A groupoid
with one object is essentially just a group. So the no-
tion of groupoid is an extension of that of groups. It
gives an additional convenience, flexibility and range
of applications...
EXAMPLE 1. A disjoint union [of groups] G =
∪λGλ, λ ∈ Λ, is a groupoid: the product ab is defined
if and only if a, b belong to the same Gλ, and ab is
then just the product in the group Gλ. There is an
identity 1λ for each λ ∈ Λ. The maps α, β coincide
and map Gλ to λ, λ ∈ Λ.
EXAMPLE 2. An equivalence relation R on [a
set] X becomes a groupoid with α, β : R → X the
two projections, and product (x, y)(y, z) = (x, z)
whenever (x, y), (y, z) ∈ R. There is an identity,
namely (x, x), for each x ∈ X...
Weinstein (1996) makes the following fundamental point:
Almost every interesting equivalence relation on
a space B arises in a natural way as the orbit equiv-
alence relation of some groupoid G over B. Instead
of dealing directly with the orbit space B/G as an
object in the category Smap of sets and mappings,
one should consider instead the groupoid G itself as
an object in the category Ghtp of groupoids and ho-
motopy classes of morphisms.
The groupoid approach has become quite popular in the
study of networks of coupled dynamical systems which can
be defined by differential equation models, (e.g., Golubitsky
and Stewart 2006).
9.2 Global and Local Symmetry Groupoids
Here we follow Weinstein (1996) fairly closely, using his ex-
ample of a finite tiling.
Consider a tiling of the euclidean plane R2 by identical 2 by
1 rectangles, specified by the set X (one dimensional) where
the grout between tiles is X = H ∪V , having H = R×Z and
V = 2Z × R, where R is the set of real numbers and Z the
integers. Call each connected component ofR2\X, that is, the
complement of the two dimensional real plane intersecting X,
a tile.
Let Γ be the group of those rigid motions of R2 which leave
X invariant, i.e., the normal subgroup of translations by ele-
ments of the lattice Λ = H ∩ V = 2Z × Z (corresponding to
corner points of the tiles), together with reflections through
each of the points 1/2Λ = Z×1/2Z, and across the horizontal
and vertical lines through those points. As noted by Weinstein
(1996), much is lost in this coarse-graining, in particular the
same symmetry group would arise if we replaced X entirely
by the lattice Λ of corner points. Γ retains no information
about the local structure of the tiled plane. In the case of
a real tiling, restricted to the finite set B = [0, 2m] × [0, n]
the symmetry group shrinks drastically: The subgroup leav-
ing X ∩ B invariant contains just four elements even though
15
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
09
.3
89
4.
2 
: P
os
te
d 
11
 N
ov
 2
00
9
a repetitive pattern is clearly visible. A two-stage groupoid
approach recovers the lost structure.
We define the transformation groupoid of the action of Γ
on R2 to be the set
G(Γ, R2) = {(x, γ, y|x ∈ R2, y ∈ R2, γ ∈ Γ, x = γy},
with the partially defined binary operation
(x, γ, y)(y, ν, z) = (x, γν, z).
Here α(x, γ, y) = x, and β(x, γ, y) = y, and the inverses are
natural.
We can form the restriction of G to B (or any other subset
of R2) by defining
G(Γ, R2)|B = {g ∈ G(Γ, R2)|α(g), β(g) ∈ B}
[1]. An orbit of the groupoid G over B is an equivalence
class for the relation
x ∼G y if and only if there is a groupoid element g with
α(g) = x and β(g) = y.
Two points are in the same orbit if they are similarly placed
within their tiles or within the grout pattern.
[2]. The isotropy group of x ∈ B consists of those g in G
with α(g) = x = β(g). It is trivial for every point except
those in 1/2Λ∩B, for which it is Z2×Z2, the direct product
of integers modulo two with itself.
By contrast, embedding the tiled structure within a larger
context permits definition of a much richer structure, i.e., the
identification of local symmetries.
We construct a second groupoid as follows. Consider the
plane R2 as being decomposed as the disjoint union of P1 =
B ∩X (the grout), P2 = B\P1 (the complement of P1 in B,
which is the tiles), and P3 = R
2\B (the exterior of the tiled
room). Let E be the group of all euclidean motions of the
plane, and define the local symmetry groupoid Gloc as the set
of triples (x, γ, y) in B × E × B for which x = γy, and for
which y has a neighborhood U in R2 such that γ(U ∩Pi) ⊆ Pi
for i = 1, 2, 3. The composition is given by the same formula
as for G(Γ, R2).
For this groupoid-in-context there are only a finite number
of orbits:
O1 = interior points of the tiles.
O2 = interior edges of the tiles.
O3 = interior crossing points of the grout.
O4 = exterior boundary edge points of the tile grout.
O5 = boundary ‘T’ points.
O6 = boundary corner points.
The isotropy group structure is, however, now very rich
indeed:
The isotropy group of a point in O1 is now isomorphic to
the entire rotation group O2.
It is Z2 × Z2 for O2.
For O3 it is the eight-element dihedral group D4.
For O4,O5 and O6 it is simply Z2.
These are the ‘local symmetries’ of the tile-in-context.
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